This paper explores the policy options available to the United States for regulating greenhouse gas emissions from aircraft under existing law: the Clean Air Act (CAA). Europe has unilaterally and controversially moved to include aviation emissions in its Emissions Trading System. The United States can, however, allow its airlines to escape this requirement by imposing -equivalent‖ regulation. U.S. aviation emissions rules could also have significant environmental benefits and would limit domestic emissions beyond the reach of the European Union. With new legislation unlikely, the CAA is the only plausible vehicle for such regulation. Title II Part B of the CAA does grant EPA broad regulatory authority over aviation emissions, though this authority has not been used aggressively. EPA could impose meaningful aviation GHG limits and, by using performance standards, give airlines incentives to creatively comply. It might further be possible to allow some forms of emissions trading, though the law is unclear. Emissions by foreign airlines in the United States could be covered under the act, though international law might impose barriers.
a regulatory program using the various tools available under the Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from a variety of sources, including road vehicles and certain power plants and industrial facilities.
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The CAA also includes provisions granting EPA significant authority to regulate air pollution from aircraft, a significant source of GHG emissions. The agency has used this  Nathan Richardson is a resident scholar at Resources for the Future; richardson@rff.org. authority in the past to regulate other pollutants from aircraft, though since 1982 it has closely followed standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). ICAO has not issued GHG standards and appears unlikely to do so any time soon. 6 EPA has so far shown relatively little desire to use its CAA authority to regulate GHGs independently of ICAOdespite petitions to do so and an ensuing lawsuit.
GHG emissions from aviation have become a contentious international issue. In 2008, the EU broke with ICAO, deciding to independently regulate aviation GHG emissions by requiring airlines to participate in its cap-and-trade system, the Emissions Trading System (ETS), starting in 2012. 7 Controversially, the EU policy requires both foreign and domestic airlines to comply, and requires purchase of ETS allowances sufficient to cover the entire flight path of any journey beginning or ending at an EU airport. 8 The U.S. and many other countries strongly objected to this decision, with the U.S. House of Representatives-in a rare parallel with Chinese policy 9 -passing a bill that would make it illegal for U.S. carriers to comply. The EU decision contains an escape clause, however. Carriers from countries that have -equivalent‖ aviation GHG emissions policies can be exempted from the ETS. 12 The U.S. could 6 12 See EU Directive, supra note 8, ¶ 17. The Directive explicitly mentions only other countries' policies limiting emissions from flights to the EU, but indicates that the EU should seek -optimal interaction‖ with other countries' policies and -avoid double regulation‖. This leaves ample room to exempt any emissions covered by another country's regulatory scheme from the ETS.
therefore craft an aviation emissions policy on its own terms and possibly avoid the burden of EU regulation. However, the current political climate in Congress makes new legislation imposing GHG limits unrealistic for the time being. If the U.S. is to adopt such a policy in the near future, therefore, the CAA appears to be the only plausible vehicle.
Can CAA regulation achieve aviation emissions regulations significant enough to establish equivalency with EU policy while remaining cost-effective and politically acceptable?
Fully answering this question requires judgments about the range of options realistically available to EPA in the current U.S. political environment and about the range of policies the EU would consider -equivalent‖-judgments that would be, at best, informed guesses.
But the core part of the question is legal-what tools are available to the agency under the CAA to regulate aviation emissions, and how might they be used for GHGs? This paper is an attempt to answer that core legal question.
The agency's powers to address aviation GHGs under the Act have not been thoroughly studied. A few court decisions, EPA documents, and petitions to the agency have looked at the issue or aspects of it, but none is a comprehensive assessment. One relatively brief scholarly treatment exists, 13 and although it is a useful introduction to many of the relevant issues, much has changed since it was published in 2009. I also reach different conclusions on some points, as noted below.
EPA regulation of aviation GHG emissions under the CAA is the subject of current litigation. 14 However, that litigation concerns whether the agency must regulate such emissions.
This threshold issue is relevant, but both parties to the litigation agree that EPA has authority to regulate aviation emissions. Moreover, the outcome of the suit does nothing to clarify how the agency could regulate, whether it is chooses to do so or is compelled. It is this latter question that this paper seeks to answer.
In short, the legal analysis that follows indicates that the CAA does provide EPA with substantial and flexible authority to regulate aviation GHG emissions. Doing so will require the agency to depart from its traditional use of this authority, but neither the statute nor international law appears to stand in the way. The Act further appears to give the agency authority to implement smart regulation in the form of performance standards that give compliance flexibility to industry and perhaps allow limited use of market-based mechanisms. Political and administrative challenges remain for EPA, however.
II. The Clean Air Act and Aviation
The Clean Air Act grants EPA expansive authority to regulate aviation emissions. EPA has exercised this authority for a number of pollutants since the 1970s, but over the past 30 years it has always modeled its regulations under this title after international standards. In part due to this link, EPA regulations have not generally forced manufacturers to significantly change their products. Nevertheless, EPA's regulatory track record under the Act is relevant, as it may indicate EPA's own judgment about the extent of its authority.
A. Aviation Provisions in the Act
Provisions granting authority to regulate aviation emissions date to the 1970 enactment of the core of the modern CAA. Title II of the statute governs emissions from mobile sources; while the vast majority of it (Part A) is devoted to fuel and emissions standards for surface vehicles, Part B of the Title is specifically aimed at aviation emissions. 15 This Part grants EPA broad powers to set -emissions standards‖ for aircraft engines. The agency, however, has used these powers only infrequently and in limited fashion.
Part B is quite short-only about a page long-and its substantive provisions are even shorter. A single paragraph, Section 231(a)(2)(A), is the source of the agency's authority:
The Administrator shall, from time to time, issue proposed emissions standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of aircraft engines which in his judgment causes, or contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. 16 Much of the remainder of Part B deals with procedural issues, such as a requirement that EPA consult with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in issuing standards. The only substantive limitation imposed is that standards may not be changed so as to significantly increase noise or decrease safety. The Part also includes a preemption clause prohibiting states 15 CAA § 231 et seq. 16 CAA § 231(a)(2)(A). from adopting independent aircraft emissions standards. FAA is also solely responsible for regulation of aviation fuels.
The core of Part B is similar to other provisions contained elsewhere in the CAA that apply to other sources. In particular, its language is nearly identical to that found in the core Section of Title II Part A (Section 202).
17 Both sections require the agency to determine whether a given type of air pollution -endanger[s] public health or welfare‖ and, if so, whether emissions from the class of sources in question -causes, or contributes to‖ that pollution. These determinations, respectively, are the -endangerment‖ and -cause or contribute‖ findings. Positive endangerment and cause/contribute findings are the prerequisites for regulation, but they also compel the agency to regulate due to the mandatory language in both Sections.
The similarities between Part A and Part B end there, however. Section 202 is followed by over 40 pages of substantive and procedural text that clarifies, limits, and dictates the regulatory authority given to the agency over surface vehicles. 18 As noted above, Part B contains almost no such explanatory and limiting text. This makes interpretation somewhat more difficult, though it likely also means that the agency's powers under Part B are broader, especially given the deference shown to agency interpretations of their statutory authority under Chevron.
Another important difference between aviation regulation under Part B and surface vehicle regulation in Part A is that authority is divided between EPA and FAA. Although EPA is solely responsible for setting environmental standards for aircraft, FAA is charged with actual regulation of the industry, and the act requires EPA to consult with FAA in setting standards.
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B. History of Clean Air Act Aviation Rules
Though Part B grants EPA broad authority to regulate aviation emissions, the agency has in the past exercised this authority conservatively. Note, however, that this decision is based on a reading of Title II Part B that grants EPA sufficiently broad authority that it may follow ICAO if it wishes to do so, not a reading that the agency's authority is so narrow that it must follow ICAO. In other words, nothing in the decision precludes the agency from deviating from ICAO standards in the future. 31 Section 0 discusses whether international law may impose any such limitations.
In general, EPA has applied its past aviation emissions standards to a limited set of pollutants and imposes no requirements above and beyond those required of all ICAO members.
Their effect on engine manufacturers has been small. However, the language of Title II Part B is broad, and on the one occasion when federal courts have been asked to define the limits of EPA's authority, they have found it to be expansive. 
IV. Aviation GHG Developments So Far
Though it has been petitioned by the states and sued by environmental groups, EPA has yet to implement regulations of GHG emissions from aviation. Moreover, neither EPA's statements to date nor the petitions and lawsuits shed significant light on EPA's regulatory options. Therefore, new examination of the relevant statute is needed.
A. EPA Inaction
As noted, EPA has not moved to regulate GHG emissions from aviation under the CAA.
On one hand, this is not surprising. While U.S. GHG emissions from aviation are not trivial, as shown in Error! Reference source not found., they are dwarfed by those from the primary ectors EPA has moved to regulate-transportation and coal-fired power 43 (though they are comparable to those from the refining sector, which the agency has also committed to regulate). 44 It is understandable for EPA to seek to address the largest GHG sources first, given its limited resources. Regulators may assume that the sectors with the greatest emissions also have the greatest potential for cost-effective reductions, though this is not necessarily the case. Emissions from the surface transportation and electricity sectors may be so large that regulators assume they are the best targets. 40 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
B. The California and Environmental Petitions
States and environmental groups separately petitioned EPA to regulate aviation GHGs would not do so until 2009) and, more specifically, a cause/contribute finding for aircraft. 48 Petitioners further argued that opportunities to reduce aviation GHG emissions via engine design, airframe design, and operational changes are available and should be targeted by EPA standards under Title II Part B. 49
C. The 2008 ANPR
The agency did not formally respond to these petitions. Instead, it reiterated its arguments in the 2008 ANPR and requested comment. 50 EPA also included a broad, albeit relatively brief, discussion of options for regulating aircraft emissions in the document. In this discussion, the agency suggests technological and operational opportunities for aviation emissions reductions, 51
echoing the petitions, and options for regulatory design. 52 The ANPR, however, gives relatively little indication of the agency's view of the petitioners' arguments, the legal limits of regulation under Title II Part B, or its regulatory policy preferences for aircraft GHG emissions. For the most part, the document simply lays out options and requests comment.
D. Recent Litigation-Must EPA Regulate?
The agency's failure to respond or to regulate aircraft GHG emissions as requested led the environmental petitioners to sue in 2010, arguing not only that the agency had violated the CAA by failing to respond, but also that the statute requires EPA to determine whether it will issue endangerment and cause/contribute findings, and presumably therefore to regulate aviation emissions. 53 Specifically, the environmental plaintiffs allege that EPA's failure to issue an endangerment decision under Section 231 constitutes an unreasonable delay, given its existing EPA, however, claims that Section 231 gives it the discretion to choose when and whether to consider an endangerment finding. 55 The agency agrees, however, with the plaintiffs that, once such an endangerment finding (and a related cause/contribute finding) has been made, the mandatory language of Section 231 requires it to regulate. 56 If the environmental plaintiffs prevail, the agency will be compelled to make endangerment and cause/contribute 
E. Beyond Litigation
Even if the plaintiffs win and EPA is compelled to make endangerment and cause/contribute determinations, relatively little is resolved. First, the agency could make a negative endangerment or, much more likely, cause/contribute determination, either of which would preclude regulation. This seems extremely unlikely for an endangerment finding, since the agency has issued a similar finding under Section 202. Analysis of the threat to public health and welfare is identical for all GHGs, regardless of their source, because GHGs are a global, uniformly mixing pollutant. But it is conceivable that the agency might determine that emissions from aircraft do not cause or contribute to GHG harms sufficiently to constitute endangerment.
Such a finding undoubtedly would be challenged by environmental groups but is not obviously arbitrary or unreasonable, given the difference in total emissions between the two sectors (motor vehicles and aviation). 60 Moreover, even if the agency issues positive findings and is therefore compelled to regulate aviation emissions in some fashion, it retains broad discretion over the form and stringency of those regulations-a fact that the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) court scrupulously noted in its denial of EPA's summary judgment motion, citing the DC Circuit's earlier holding in NACAA. 61 The breadth of the agency's authority is rooted in the relative lack of restrictions imposed by the (brief) plain language of the statute and the agency's discretion to interpret that language under the Chevron doctrine. 62 The outcome of CBD v. EPA is therefore interesting and important, but it would do nothing to clarify the options available to EPA when and if it actually regulates aviation GHG emissions. The 2008 ANPR is somewhat more helpful in this regard, but its preliminary character and noncommittal language limit its value. A new look at Title II Part B is therefore needed, informed by both its past use and more recent regulatory action for GHGs under other parts of the CAA.
V. What Can EPA Regulate, and How?
Whether the agency chooses to regulate aviation GHG emissions under Title II Part B or its hand is forced by courts, it will have three fundamental policy choices to make. The agency must decide the scope of the regulation, its stringency, and the regulatory tool it will use-60 Some scholars have argued that failure to issue a cause/contribute finding for aviation emissions could be rejected by a court on the grounds that it would in fact be arbitrary or capricious, given the volume of aviation GHG emissions and the Supreme Court's dicta in Massachusetts that the contribution of the U.S. transportation sector to global emissions (6 percent at the time) was -enormous including, possibly, market-based mechanisms. The permissible scope of regulation and the set of tools available to EPA are legal questions, and the following sections address them in some detail. Stringency is predominately a policy question, but some relevant legal constraints are worth considering.
A. Scope
Past EPA regulation under Title II Part B has been limited in scope, focusing almost exclusively on new aircraft engines. The statute allows much broader regulation, however, as the following sections explain. Even where it imposes apparent limitations, such as its focus on aircraft engines, EPA can design its regulation so as to allow operators a broad range of compliance options.
Traditional Standards for New Engines
In its past regulatory actions under Title II Part B, EPA has generally used standards aimed at new aircraft engines. The standards are technological in the sense that they discriminate among different classes of engines and are based, ultimately, on ICAO's technological assessments, but they do not generally require that new engines adopt specific technological upgrades. In this sense, they are really performance standards, though the agency does not refer to them as such. Under such standards, newly designed (more accurately, newly certified) or in some cases newly produced engines must meet a specified emissions rate. For example, the 2005
revised NO x standards required engines with thrust rated over 89 kN to achieve emissions reductions of about 16 percent over previous standards (based on a complicated formula that considers design-specific characteristics).
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The agency could undoubtedly impose similar standards on aircraft engine GHG emissions, as it notes in its 2008 ANPR. 64 Such standards would limit the GHG emissions of newly designed engines to a specified rate, presumably based on the thrust capacity of the The only differences between these GHG standards and past EPA aviation engine standards is that they would apply to GHGs and would lead, rather than follow, ICAO limits, as ICAO has not yet developed standards for GHGs. Imposing more stringent regulations than ICAO is probably permissible, at least for domestic U.S. carriers and engine manufacturers, as discussed in Section 0 below. 
Existing Engines
Engines or Aircraft?
In principle, efficiency improvements from aircraft and corresponding reductions in GHG emissions might be available from changes in design of airframes as well as engines. standards that apply directly to airframes. 76 And EPA, fearing such a result, might conclude that breaking with past practice and regulating airframes is not worth the risk. As noted below, however, this limitation on the agency's authority may not matter much in practice.
Operational Standards
Similarly, the aviation industry could reduce its overall emissions through operational changes independent of engine or airframe design. Nevertheless, directly mandating operational changes via Section 231 standards would be a break with agency past practice. As with standards aimed at airframes, such regulation would be at some risk of being rejected by courts, and a cautious agency might therefore decide not to take the risk. As explained in the next Section, however, this limitation may not matter in practice.
It should be noted that many aspects of airline operational practices are governed by FAA regulations. Airlines' ability to make emissions-reducing operational changes may therefore be limited even if they are given incentives to do so by EPA regulation. EPA and FAA should therefore coordinate any future regulations, as the statute requires them to do.
Aviation Standards as Performance Standards
If EPA cannot include airframe design or operational practices in its aviation standards, its ability to achieve GHG emissions reductions-and, in particular, cost-effective reductions-is sharply limited. Standards for new engines, as noted, will take time to show emissions benefits.
Retrofits for some existing engines may be available, but these opportunities are likely to be limited and may be less cost-effective than operational changes. It is therefore not only in EPA's (and environmentalists') interest that operational changes be available as compliance options, but in industry's interest as well. A wider set of compliance options almost certainly means less costly regulation, holding stringency constant.
EPA is probably not as limited as the above analysis of the statute suggests, however.
Even if Title II Part B standards must use engine emissions as the measure of compliance, operational and airframe changes can still likely be valid compliance options. By framing requirements as performance standards, the regulation would nominally target engines but leave discretion over compliance options to carriers. Such regulations would achieve a similar (and perhaps superior) practical result to regulation that explicitly sets standards for airframe design and operational practices, but they would place decisionmaking power in the hands of those with the best information-the industry. 85 See ANPR, supra note 33, at 44470-71.
The key to such a regulatory approach is a simple insight: all GHG emissions from aircraft come from engines. Therefore, even if the CAA is interpreted as giving EPA authority only to regulate engines, this is all the authority the agency needs. The problems described above with airframe and operational-level standards appear only when engines are treated as discrete devices, rather than the emitting part of a larger system. This is a natural understanding when regulation is focused on new engines, which might be installed on any of a variety of aircraft, operating in a variety of conditions. In reality, however, emissions from engines depend fundamentally on the airframe to which they are attached and the conditions under which they are used.
EPA regulation can implement an inclusive performance standard by expressing the standard for existing engines in terms of an emissions rate, such as tons of CO 2 emitted per mile traveled. In such a program, airlines, not engine manufacturers, would be the point of regulatory compliance. EPA would set a benchmark emissions rate for each airline (or for the sector as a whole, if trading is to be permitted). An airline whose emissions rate exceeds that benchmark would have a variety of options to bring its performance in line with the standard. It could retrofit the engines on its aircraft, replace them with new engines, make retrofits to its airframes, or upgrade to entirely new aircraft. It could also make operational changes. If trading is allowed, it could purchase credits from other airlines or overcomply and sell credits. Any of these moves would, in principle, reduce emissions associated with the airline's flights (or in the case of buying credits, overall emissions in the sector). And these reductions would ultimately come (physically, at least) from aircraft engines, the target of EPA's Title II Part B standards.
As noted above, even traditional EPA aircraft engine standards are properly described as performance standards, since they require compliance with a specific emissions rate target but do not require that any specific technology be used. The key difference between such standards and the broader performance standards described in this Section is in what is being measured. By targeting emissions per mile of engines in use rather than a onetime lab measurement of emissions from each engine model, the range of compliance options is greatly expanded.
EPA suggested and requested comment on a broadly similar regulatory approach in its 2008 ANPR, though it did not call it a performance standards program:
[I]n the case of aircraft, it may be more practical and flexible to directly regulate airline fleet average GHG emissions. Under such an approach we would set a declining fleet average GHG emission standard for each fact that EPA has historically avoided regulating existing aircraft engine emissions (for which performance standards are the best fit) as with any previous belief on the agency's part that performance standards were not permissible under the Act. The agency appears never to have claimed that performance standards are impermissible, and even if the agency once had that view, it would likely be entitled to change it. 92 Finally, any argument for a narrow reading of Section 231 must confront the agency's discretion over interpreting its own statutes under Chevron.
93 This is a particularly high bar here, since the relevant part of the statute is so short-there is little on which to hang a plain language argument. The court in NACAA appears to agree that this brevity and the language of the Section give the agency broad interpretive authority.
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To claim that EPA cannot issue performance standards under Title II Part B is, in effect, to claim that the agency cannot give the industry flexibility to comply with those standards. This is bad policy, and such a position is unlikely to be supported (or advanced in litigation) by industry. Moreover, it is inconsistent with precedent. Past EPA aviation emissions standards have been framed in terms of emissions rates for given classes of engines, but the agency has not necessarily prescribed specific emissions-reducing technologies. 95 Engine manufacturers therefore have been free to adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate to meet the standard in their new designs. In this sense, past EPA regulations have really been performance standards, simply restricted to new engines (or new designs). To issue regulations allowing airlines to comply via airframe design or operational changes, it is necessary to apply the standards to existing engines and to restate the benchmark in terms of emissions per mile (or some similar metric), but it is not necessary to change the fundamental tool that has been used in the past. In other words, the agency has always used performance standards under Title II Part B, and any argument that it cannot do so must confront that precedent. It therefore appears very likely that the agency could issue performance standards for existing engines and frame them in such a way as to allow use of airframe design and operational measures to comply with the standards. Indeed, EPA should assume that such measures will be used. To the extent possible, the agency will need to model their impact when it determines the appropriate stringency of the standards and estimates their costs.
If the agency can issue such performance standards, it will still have important scoperelated decisions to make. For example, it may decide that technology-based standards are more appropriate for new engines and apply performance standards only to existing engines-or use a hybrid approach. If it bases performance standards on an emissions-per-mile benchmark, it will need to decide how to account for emissions associated with ground operations. The agency also will need to determine the point of compliance-would emissions be measured on a per-flight, per-aircraft, or per-firm basis?
Foreign Aircraft
Finally, the agency would need to determine how and whether to include foreign aircraft within the scope of its regulation. The EU, as noted above, has taken an ambitious approach, requiring carriers to purchase ETS allowances for any flights that leave from or arrive at European airports. 96 These allowances must cover the entire emissions for the flight, even those for portions of the flight outside Europe.
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As the EU approach illustrates, regulation of -foreign‖ aircraft emissions has two components: regulation of foreign-flag aircraft emissions, and regulation of emissions that occur outside the regulating country. Legal analysis of each component is different.
Nothing in the CAA prevents EPA from regulating emissions from foreign-flag aircraft in 
B. Regulatory Tools-Can EPA Allow Trading?
In addition to determining the reach of aviation standards, EPA also must choose how carriers may comply. One approach is simply to require that every engine or every flight meet the relevant standard. The agency might offer compliance flexibility, however.
Economists are nearly unanimous in their view that market-based tools are the most costeffective means for regulating emissions, particularly those of globally mixed pollutants like GHGs. The EU's ETS is itself such a market-based system. A 2009 Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report favored market-based tools for regulating aviation emissions. 101 If EPA could create a market-based regulatory system for aviation GHGs, it would almost certainly be more cost-effective than traditional performance standards and might also be more likely to be deemed -equivalent‖ to EU regulation. But is the grant of authority in Title II Part B sufficiently broad to allow the agency to implement such a program? Maybe.
Trading under Title II
EPA has used trading elements in past Title II regulation. -Averaging, banking, and trading‖ (ABT) approaches are used in various programs for on-road vehicles. These programs allow manufacturers to average emissions across all relevant models they build, bank current overcompliance for future use, and in some cases trade with other manufacturers. 102 Such programs provide at least a basic model for a trading approach under Title II Part B, and EPA suggested such an approach for aircraft engines in its 2008 ANPR. 103 There are important differences between these ABT programs and a hypothetical trading program for aviation emissions. First, they are implemented under different statutory provisions, though as noted above, the language in Section 231 governing aircraft emissions is very similar to that in Section 202 governing on-road vehicle emissions. Second, these programs are restricted to manufacturers of new vehicles or engines. They therefore provide evidence of the theoretical compatibility of trading with Title II regulation but are not directly applicable models-at least, if the agency intends to go beyond regulating new engines.
Aviation-Sector Trading under Title II Part B
The language of Section 231 does not plainly rule out a market-based approach, unless one adopts a very narrow definition of -emissions standards‖. As noted, the statute itself does not define the term. Similar terms are defined elsewhere and have been subject to agency and outside interpretation regarding this question, however. One parallel is with Section 111 of the Act, which governs performance standards for new and existing stationary sources. EPA and outside observers, myself included, have argued that Section 111 performance standards can allow trading among regulated sources. 104 If -performance standards‖ can be flexible, is there any reason to treat -emissions standards‖ differently?
It is hard to say for sure. The argument that Section 111 standards can permit trading is based in part on language in the statutory definition of -performance standards‖ indicating that they must -reflect‖ the -best system of emission reduction‖; trading, the argument goes, is the -best system‖. Section 231 does not refer to a -best system‖ or have any equivalent language, and this argument is therefore unavailable there. As noted above, however, Section 231 gives EPA broad discretion over the form and substance of aviation standards; the Section does not say EPA cannot base standards on the -best system‖ or any other principle. -Emissions standards‖ is arguably a broader term than -performance standards‖-if the former is interpreted to exclude trading, then it is difficult to argue that the latter does not as well.
Another argument in favor of trading under Section 231 is that it refers to EPA regulation of -classes‖ of aircraft engines: it is these classes, not individual engines, that are identified as 104 the object of regulation. This is not just compatible with trading, but it is essentially the definition of a market-based regulatory scheme. Under such a scheme, some measure of class performance is required, but individual members of the class may deviate from that standard, with trading (or averaging) the mechanism for assuring class-wide compliance.
Further, EPA has claimed that it has the authority under Section 231 to at least include averaging, banking, and trading programs, which allow manufacturers of new engines to comply with a fleet average standard while retaining some forms of flexibility. 105 Whether trading is permissible under Section 231 is a difficult call. On balance, I think the case for is stronger than the case against. The broad grant of authority in the section and its lack of restrictions on that authority, confirmed by the DC Circuit's holding in NACAA, are significant. Even more important is the deference to which the agency is entitled under Chevron.
For trading to be ruled incompatible with the statute, a court would have to decide either that it is forbidden by the plain language of the statute (Step One) or that EPA's interpretation is unreasonable (Step Two). The former seems very difficult, given the brevity of the section, and the latter is such a permissive standard that agencies rarely if ever lose. Nevertheless, it is not a slam dunk. There is real risk that trading could be ruled incompatible with Section 111, most likely on Chevron Step One grounds, and the chances of that are greater under Section 231 because of the lack of the helpful -best system‖ language.
Revenue
Even if the agency were able to implement a market-based regulatory scheme for aircraft engines, it would not be able to auction allowances and generate revenue. EPA has never raised revenue under an emissions trading scheme without explicit congressional authorization, and doing so would arguably be unconstitutional. 106 For similar constitutional reasons, EPA could not impose a tax on aviation emissions without legislation granting new authority. 105 See ANPR, supra note 33, at 44472. 106 The power to raise revenue is restricted to Congress (and specifically the House, at least initially) under the Constitution, Art. 1 Sec. 7 Cl. 1. EPA has argued that this and other factors make it difficult or impossible for the agency to raise revenue via allowance auctions; see ANPR, supra note 33, at 44411. Note that even if EPA were to raise revenue, it would go directly to the Treasury under the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3302, not remain with EPA for promotion of environmental goals, such as climate finance. Separate legislation would therefore be necessary to direct any auction or other revenues toward environmental objectives. Under EPA's existing stationary-source trading programs, states (which are not bound by EPA's limitations in this regard) have been delegated allocation authority and in some cases have auctioned allowances and raised revenue. But this option is not available, because aviation standards, unlike many other CAA programs, are not federalist in design-one of the few explicit limitations Congress put on aviation emissions regulations is a bar on state regulation. 107 Barring new legislation, therefore, if EPA were to implement a market-based approach to aviation emissions regulation, it would have to either adopt an approach that does not require any allocation at all, such as a tradable standard, 108 or freely distribute allowances.
C. Stringency and Consideration of Costs
Unlike other Sections of the Act, Title II Part B does not provide even an abstract measure of how stringent EPA regulations must be. Ambient air quality standards under Section 109 of the Act, for example, must be adequate to protect health and welfare (the former -with an adequate margin of safety‖), 109 while performance standards under Section 111, as noted above, must reflect the -best system of emission reduction‖. 110 The only guidance given in Title II Part B is that EPA must consult with FAA and that aviation standards must not significantly increase noise or adversely affect safety. 111 Within these limits, EPA is free to choose any level of stringency it can non-arbitrarily justify. The Act also imposes no limits on the agency's ability to revise its standards, nor does it require the agency to do so at any specified time. Based on this authority, the agency has claimed that standards that decline over time are permissible. 112 Finally, and also unlike some other Sections of the Act, 113 EPA is permitted to consider cost.
A frequent criticism of EPA regulation of GHGs under the CAA is that it will inevitably cause a -train wreck,‖ because the agency lacks the tools under the statute to cost-effectively regulate such a ubiquitous pollutant. 114 At least for aviation regulation under Title II Part B, such a result is implausible. First, the agency retains nearly unlimited discretion over the stringency of its regulations. It is simply directed to -issue. . . standards‖ without any requirement that they be sufficiently stringent to achieve even ambiguous goals such as protecting the public health or welfare. 115 The agency therefore is not compelled to regulate stringently. A useful parallel here is the agency's Tailoring Rule, under which it has restricted consideration of GHGs in permit applications to certain large emitters, despite the plain language of the statute requiring such consideration for any emitter of over 250 tons of a pollutant. No such ambitious interpretation of the statute is necessary here for the agency to have control over the breadth and stringency of the standards it proposes.
Second, and perhaps more important, Title II Part B explicitly directs the agency to consider cost when determining the compliance schedule for the standards it issues. 116 The agency could therefore adopt stringent standards and give emitters more time to comply (perhaps to allow time for engine and airframe upgrades in due course) or choose less stringent standards and require quick compliance. Either way, the agency is compelled to consider cost. Stringent, short-term standards that would impose large costs on the industry are not a realistic danger.
VI. International Law Limitations on EPA Authority
Congress' grant of authority to EPA under the CAA may not be the only limitation on its ability to regulate aviation emissions, however. As a signatory to the 1947 Chicago Convention, 117 U.S. powers to regulate the aviation sector are circumscribed. standards. Regulating GHGs using these powers would require a departure from this practice, since ICAO appears unlikely to issue standards for GHGs any time soon. 118 Interpretations of the Convention and other international agreements were key issues in the European Court of Justice's recent decision upholding the EU's move to include foreign aircraft emissions in the ETS and will be significant in any further legal action over that decision.
In many ways, understanding the scope of EPA authority requires similar analysis.
Unfortunately, matching the depth of international law analysis in that case and in other discussion of EU policy is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, a brief overview of the relevant part of the Cconvention and related arguments is useful. If the Convention does substantially restrict the agency's regulatory authority, the range of options under the CAA described above might be largely irrelevant.
Note that this section considers only potential limitations international law may impose on the ability of EPA to regulate emissions from foreign aircraft. Critics of EU policy have also argued that the Convention prohibits regulation of extraterritorial emissions as well. But because, as noted above, the CAA almost certainly does not grant such authority to EPA, the question is not relevant here.
A number of Articles in the Convention are relevant to this question. Article 37 instructs ICAO to -adopt and amend . . . as may be necessary, international standards and recommended practices and procedures‖ toward a variety of ends. Although polluting emissions are not specifically mentioned, ICAO has issued such standards, and they are generally understood to be within the scope of its standard-setting powers in Article 37. 119 While it encourages -the highest The Chicago Convention does not require all Contracting States to adopt identical airworthiness standards. Although the Convention urges a high degree of uniformity, it is expected that States will adopt their own airworthiness standards, and it is anticipated that some states may adopt standards that are more stringent than those agreed upon by ICAO. . . As long as a participating nation of ICAO adopts aircraft emission standards that are equal to or more stringent than ICAO's standards, the certificates of airworthiness for such nations are valid. Thus, aircraft belonging to countries with more stringent standards are permitted to travel through the airspace of other countries without any restriction. . . if a nation sets tighter standards than ICAO, air carriers not based in that nation (foreign-flag carriers) would only be required to comply with the ICAO standards.
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Both California and the environmental groups petitioning the agency agree with this position, at least with respect to domestic carriers.
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In short, the Chicago Convention does not restrict EPA authority to regulate GHG emissions from U.S. aircraft or to regulate U.S. aircraft engine manufacturers. The last two options create further problems, however, since they are functionally identical to the EU's move to impose extraterritorial regulation. They not only would expose the United States to claims of hypocrisy, but also may make its legal position untenable, because the same trade and international law arguments being made against the EU could be directed at the United States. Both would also require new legislation.
The only viable option therefore might be to exclude many international flights by U.S. carriers from regulation under the CAA. Doing so could open EPA to charges of arbitrary regulation, however, because the reasons for discriminating in this way have nothing to do with either the public health benefits of the regulation or its cost.
VII. Conclusions
The aviation sector is responsible for a small but significant part of the world's GHG emissions. Stalled efforts to limit these emissions through ICAO and the EU's recent decision to regulate them unilaterally have presented the United States with an opportunity to regulate aviation emissions on its own terms.
The Clean Air Act gives EPA powerful tools to regulate these emissions. In the past, the agency has used these powers only to implement limits that have already been agreed on at the international level. But neither the act nor, apparently, international law prevents the agency from acting on its own initiative, at least domestically. Courts will soon decide whether the agency must regulate aviation GHG emissions. But even if it is not required to do so, EPA could regulate at least some aviation emissions at any time.
When and if the agency does move to regulate these emissions, the statute gives it broad discretion over scope, stringency, and regulatory mechanism. By framing regulations in the form of performance standards, the agency could provide incentives not only to reduce direct emissions from engines, but also to make changes in operational practices and, over time, aircraft design that would increase efficiency and lower both GHG emissions and fuel costs.
Furthermore, the agency may be able to use at least some market-based tools to increase the costeffectiveness of these regulations.
The statute requires EPA to consider costs in the timing of its rules and permits it to do so generally. There is also some evidence that the agency could adopt flexible compliance approaches, including trading. This is important because cost-effective regulation not only reduces regulatory burdens (both social costs and industry costs), but also allows the agency to pursue greater emissions reductions at similar cost. In other words, more cost-effective regulation increases the size of the pie, which can then be divided between environmental outcomes and economic impacts.
There are important limits to the agency's capabilities, however. For example, the agency could not auction allowances under a tradable system or otherwise use the regulatory program to generate revenue. CAA regulation therefore would be unable to contribute meaningfully to climate finance projects, in the United States or elsewhere. Ironically, imposing CAA regulation could reduce the amount of money globally available for climate finance, since it would presumably allow U.S. carriers to escape the ETS, which does generate such revenue. U.S. policy would reduce domestic emissions that the ETS cannot reach, but (at least without new legislation) at the cost of revenue to support other mitigation or adaptation projects.
Moreover, it is unclear what type of regulation and what level of stringency would be sufficient for the EU to determine that U.S. regulation is -equivalent‖, allowing U.S. airlines to escape the ETS.
Determining the policy tools available to EPA does not determine how stringent any aviation GHG regulations should be, or even whether they should be implemented at all. Some in the aviation industry and, until recently, ICAO have argued that existing market pressures to reduce fuel costs already provide adequate incentives to reduce fuel consumption and, therefore, emissions. If this view is correct, then cost-effective opportunities for emissions reduction may not be available, and the agency should not regulate (and is likely entitled to refuse to do so on these grounds). This argument is weaker in a world in which some U.S. aircraft emissions are subject to EU regulation, because associated regulatory burdens must be borne whether EPA regulates or not. In any case, if the agency believes cost-effective technological or operational measures are available, it has the tools available to require and/or incentivize their adoption.
Regulating aviation emissions is politically sensitive, as U.S. outrage over EU policy shows. The political impact of the EU policy for U.S. emissions regulation is ambiguous. On the one hand, it could make domestic regulation more palatable, because it would be done on U.S.
terms rather than European ones. On the other hand, EPA could more easily be portrayed as caving to European pressure.
These legal and political issues make it difficult to predict what EPA will do regarding aviation emissions, much less to recommend any specific course of action. Nevertheless, it is clear that Title II Part B of the CAA gives the agency the necessary authority to implement environmentally significant, cost-effective aviation emissions standards. When and if the agency decides to (or is forced to) use these powers, it can do so effectively-provided it is both bold and smart. 
